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'IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF TKE STATE OF UTAH

GERALD M. BUTLER
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14750

SPORTS HAVEN INTERNATIONAL,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a wrongful death action brought by the father
of a three-year old boy who drowned in a swimming pool on
July 18, 1973.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow, presiding, granted Summary Judgment in
favor of defendant-respondent and against plaintiffappellant.- no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant has failed to clearly and completely
state the facts relevant to this appeal and a restatement
of the facts is necessary.

The parties will hereinafter

be designated as they appeared in the trial court.
On July 18, 1973, the plaintiff's deceased, Gerald M.
Butler, Jr., drowned in a swimming pool maintained by this
defendant near Fairview, Utah in Sanpete County.

Defendant

is a non-profit organization that maintains recreational
facilities and property which are owned by its members.
Plaintiff became a member of Sports Haven International
in early 1970 when he purchased a one-acre parcel of the
5,000 acre Sports Haven property-

[Deposition of Gerald

M. Butler, pages 21, 17]. As members, he and his family
were free to develop their own property and were entitled
to use common facilities, including a clubhouse and the
subject swimming pool, and to participate in recreational
activities, including horseback riding, snowmobiling and
boating.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page IS]. Begin-

ning in 1970, he and his family stayed at Sports Haven two
or three times a month and thereafter continued to make
frequent trips to the development.

[Deposition of Gerald M.

Butler, pages 18, 23].
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On the day of the accident, the plaintiff, his wife,
their five children and two guests were staying in plaintiff's trailer which was parked in an area approximately
100 yards from the swimming pool,
pages 26-27].

[Plaintiff's Deposition,

July 18th was a Wednesday and there were very

few other members or guests at the development.

[Deposition

of Gerald M. Butler, page 33J.
The pool and dressing facilities were completely enclosed with a chain link fence and were accessible only
through a gate at the southeast corner.

[Deposition of

Gerald M. Eutler, pages 19, 39; Affidavit of Wendell A.
Davis]•

Plaintiff knew defendant did not provide a lifeguard

and also knew small children were not to use the pool without supervision.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, pages 19-

20, 27; Affidavit of Wendell A. Davis].

Warning signs were

posted on the premises advising members that no lifeguard was
present and that children under the age of 14 were not to use
the pool without an adult in attendance.

[Affidavit of Wendell

A. Davis].
On the afternoon of July 18, 1973, plaintiff's wife
accompanied their children and guests to the swimming pool
and watched the smaller ones while they played in the pool.
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 24]. Mrs. Butler
escorted three-year old

!f

Chuckielf and six-year old "Susie"
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back to the trailer later that afternoon.
Gerald M. Butler, page. 27].

(.Deposition of

The older children remained

in the pool until Mrs. Butler summoned them to dinner.
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 29]..
At approximately 7:00 p.m., after the family had eaten
and rested for some period of time, the older girls, ranging
in age from 10 to 15 years old, decided to return to the
pool.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, pages 28, 29].

Chuckie and his sister Susie wandered off together to play
on the swings located in a separate area 50-7 5 yards from
the enclosed pool area.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler,

page 30]. The plaintiff and his wife remained in their
trailer. [Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 30].
After approximately 15 minutes, Susie returned without her brother who, she reported to her mother, had decided
to stay at the swings for a while longer.

[Deposition of

Gerald M. Butler, pages 31, 32]. Not long afterwards, the
older children had gotten out of the pool and retrieved
their towels from the dressing rooms when Mrs. Butler
"hollered down to them and asked them if Chuckie was with
them and they said, fNof.ff

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler,

page 31]. The children returned to the trailer and another
10 or 15 minutes elapsed before the plaintiff and his wife
became concerned about the infant.

[Deposition of Gerald

M. Butler, page 33].
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Approximately 4 5 minutes after Chuckie had left the
trailer,, Mr. and Mrs. Butler began searching for him.

The

plaintiff went to the pool area and looked into the water,
but he stated he could not see the child.
Gerald M. Butler, pages 34-35].

[Deposition of

After looking in other

areas, Mr. Butler summoned Wendell A. Davis, president of
Sports Haven International, who was staying in a trailer
nearby.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 34; Affidavit

of Wendell A. Davis].

They returned to the swimming pool

where they discovered the boyfs body.

Their efforts to

resuscitate him failed.
Plaintiff contends Sports Haven was negligent in failing to prevent the deceased from gaining access to the
enclosed pool area.

The entire area is fenced, but plain-

tiff asserts the latch on the gate was inoperative.

[Depo-

sition of Gerald M. Butler, page 40]. He also contends that
the water in the swimming pool was so "murky" he could not
see to the bottom of the pool.

Had the water been clearer,

plaintiff maintains he might have been able to find the boy
in time to revive him.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler,

page 4 2 ] .
Plaintiff does not know whether his children, or others
using the pool, left the gate open or closed.

[Deposition

of Gerald M. Butler, page 41]. Whether the three-year old
infant gained access to the pool area by walking through an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

open gate or by pushing the unlatched gate open is, and will
remain, a total mystery.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler,

page 41]. Also, since no one witnessed the infant's fall
into the pool, plaintiff can only guess how long the deceased
remained under water before the search began and the plaintiff
first arrived at the pool site.
Eased on these facts, defendant sought a Summary Judgment for the reason that plaintiff could not prove the requisite causal connection between the negligence complained of
and the death of the infant.

In response to the motion,

plaintiff could not offer any additional information to show
that the condition of the latch, rather than the open gate,
gave the infant access to the pool or that the three-year old
could have been revived even if found when the plaintiff first
went to the pool more than 10 minutes after the other children
returned to the trailer.

[Affidavit of Gerald M. Butler].

Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE CAUSAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINED
OF AND TEE DROWNING WITHOUT RESORTING TO
IMPERMISSIBLE SPECULATION.
Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this case to the lower
court for trial because a fact issue exists as to whether this
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defendant was negligent by failing to repair an alleged
faulty latch or by failing to provide water clear enough
to afford visibility of the bottom of the pool.

Regardless

of whether a fact issue as to negligence exists, the Court
should affirm the ruling of the court below because plaintiff cannot prove the requisite nexus between such alleged
negligence and the drowning.
The plaintiff's burden in this action and the principle
followed by the court below in granting Summary Judgment are
concisely stated in Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.
566 (1949), as follows:
It is fundamental that the burden rests upon the
plaintiff to establish the causal connection between the injury and the alleged negligence of
the defendant; that the court may not permit the
jury to speculate concerning defendants' liability; and that the court is required to direct
a verdict unless there is evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find in favor of the plaintiff. 209 P.2d at 568. (Citations omitted).
As the court below correctly recognized, plaintiff cannot
meet this burden without resorting to iraperiaissible speculation and his action must fail.
The condition of the latch securing the gate is in
dispute, but plaintiff contends it was defective.

The con-

dition of the latch is irrelevant, however, since the jury
cannot be allowed to speculate that the latch, instead of
the negligence of others in failing to close the gate,
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provided access to the swimming pool.
is equally likely.

Either conclusion

As the plaintiff testified in his depo-

sition:
Q.

Now, in view of the way this thing happened,
what is it that you claim that the club did
wrong, or failed to do that it should have
done?

A.

They should have had the gate taken care of
properly. I don't know whether the gate
was closed completely when I went through
it or not. I was not thinking of that at
all, I was just thinking of possibly seeing
him in there. Of course, when I didn't see
him in there, I was relieved.

Q.

But you don't know whether the girls left
the pool area, closed the gate or left it
open or whether anyone else had been there
in the meantime.

A.

No.

Q.

So the manner in which the gate was opened,
is just a total mystery, so far as you are
concerned?

A.

Yes.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Eutler, page 41].
Since the negligence of others in failing to close the
gate was as likely a cause of the deceased's access to the
pool as was the condition of the latch, the long-standing
rule announced in Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Company, 51
Utah 189, 170 ?. 80 (1917) is dispositive of this portion
of the plaintiff's claim.

In that case, the Court stated:
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The rule is well established that where an accident occurs through the alleged negligence of
one person which results in injury or damage
to another, and the injured person seeks to recover damages, and it is made to appear that
the accident may have been occasioned by one
of two or several causes, and that the person
complained of is responsible only for one of
them, then the burden is on the plaintiff to
show that the accident and the resulting damages
were produced by the cause for v/hich the person
complained of is responsible, and in the case of
a failure to establish such fact the plaintiff
must fail in the action. 170 P. at 83,
The Court then cited with approval from 29 Cyc. 625 where it
is stated:
The evidence must, however, do more than merely
raise a conjecture or show a probability as tc
the cause of the injury, and no recovery can be
had if the evidence leaves it to conjecture which
of two probable causes resulted in the injury,
where defendant was liable for onlv one of them.
Id.
A legion of cases preceded and followed the Tremelling
decision all of which recognize and resolutely adhere to
the rule that the plaintiff must prove by more than mere
conjecture or probability that the acts complained of occurred as he alleges.

See, e«g«, Reid v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.

Co^, 39 Utah 617, 118 P. 1009 (1911); Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n
of Ry. Employees, 97 Utah 91, 89 P.2d 490 (1939); Sumsion v.
Streator-Smith Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943); Devine
v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955); In re Richard's
Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542 (1956).
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In this case, the deceased gained access to the pool
area by reason of one of two equally probable, but mutually
exclusive, acts of negligence.

If the plaintiff's children

or others using the pool left the gate open, such negligence
would necessarily be the sole proximate cause of the deceased's ability to enter the pool area.

A defective latch

is no less effective than a functional one when a gate is
left wide open.

Since the plaintiff's young children left

the pool area just prior to the drowning, the court cannot
allow the jury to speculate that they closed the gate and,
but for the defective latch, the infant would not have been
able to enter the pool area.
The plaintiff's claim that the "murkiness" of the water
in the pool proximately caused the death of the infant is
similarly too speculative to support a recovery against this
defendant.

According to the plaintiff's version of the facts,

no one was present in the pool area when his infant son entered.

As he testified at his deposition:

Q.

So when the girls left the pool to go in
the clubhouse to get towels and so on,
there was no one around the pool then to
observe Chuckie and how he got in to the
pool?

A.

Right.

Q.

And you never did find out how he got in?

A.

Well, the only v/ay he could have gotten
in v/as the gate, the gate was open.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q.

I mean, you didnft find anyone who observed
him going in?
-

A.

No.

[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, pages 33-34].
Since no one was present to see the infant fail into
the water, the plaintiff can only speculate how long the
child had been in the pool before the first persons arrived
who could have seen him under any circumstances.

No search

for the deceased began until more than 10 minutes after the
plaintiff's other children had returned to the trailer.
[Deposition of Gerald M. Butler, page 42; Affidavit of
Gerald M. Butler].

Whether the child could have been re-

vived at that time, is, and will remain, an unanswerable
question.
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie
case by relying upon the alleged condition of the water.

In

order to do so, he must prove that the death would not have
occurred but for his inability to see through the water to
the bottom of the pool.

To constitute the proximate cause

of che death, the conduct complained of must be such that
the accident would not have occurred absent such cause.

See

e.g., Kawaguchi v. Bennett, 112 Utah 442, 189 P.2d 109
(1948); Coxv. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 (1953).
The absence of persons who could have seen arid quickly
rescued the deceased, had visibility not been obscured,
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distinguishes Burgert v. Tietjens, 499 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.
1974) from the facts of the instant case.

In Burgert/ the

deceased drowned in a public pool where lifeguards were
present to supervise swimmers.

Since lifeguards were

present around the pool, the court reasoned that the jury
would not necessarily have to resort to conjecture to conclude that the deceased could have been rescued had a cloudy
water condition not obscured visibility.

In the instant case,

the jury would necessarily have to speculate that someone
arrived at the pool before any rescue effort would have been
futile.
Plaintiff has not asserted any claim before this Court
that defendant's failure to provide lifeguards or attendants
could constitute negligence in this case.
this issue is clearly correct.

His concession of

Owners of private facilities,

as in this case, are held to a less stringent standard of
care than proprietors of public facilities.

See e.g.,

Cale v. Johnson, 177 Kan. 576, 280 P-2d 538 (1955); Tulsa
Exposition and Fair Corp. v. Jayner, 257 P.2d 1077 (Okla.
1953); 85 C.J.S. Theaters and Shows §41. Nevertheless, even
proprietors of public swimming pools are not required to
provide lifequards or attendants to comply with safety
recommendations promulgated by the Utah State Division of
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Health.

Recognizing that swimming pools are often neces-

sarily made available for use during most hours of the day,
even though few people, if any, may actually use the facility
at any given time, the State concedes that requiring an
attendant to be present at all times would clearly be unreasonable.

Accordingly, even operators of public pools may

elect the following alternative to providing lifeguards:
Where no lifeguard service is provided, a warning sign shall be placed in plain view and shall
state "Warning-no lifeguard on duty" with clearly
legible letters, at least four inches high. In
addition, the sign shall also state "Children
should not use pool without an adult in attendance." Utah State Division of Health Recommended Code of Regulations on the Design, Construction and Operating of Public Swimming Pools,
§87 (adopted July 21, 1965).
Even though this defendant is not required to comply
with such safety recommendations, it did so.

Since the time

the pool was open in 1372 and at the time of this incident,
a warning sign was located on the fence surrounding the pool
which warned that no lifequard was on duty and that children
under 14 should not use the pool without an adult in attendance.

[Affidavit of Wendell A. Davis].

The fact that an unfortunate accident occurred upon
this defendant's property does not, of course, establish
that it is liable.

Eaton v. Savage, 28 Utah 2d 353, 502
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P.2d 564 (1972); Pollick v. J, C. Penney Co., 24 Utah 2d 405,
473 P.2d 394 (1970).

As the court below correctly held,

plaintiff has failed to offer the requisite proof that the
conduct complained of proximately caused the child's death.
Allegations that the condition.of the latch and the water
in the pool caused this accident are necessarily dependent
upon surmise, conjecture, guess and speculation.
CONCLUSION
No witness has been

found who knows exactly how or when

the infant entered the pool enclosure and how, when and under
what circumstances he fell into the pool.

The plaintiff's

allegation that a faulty latch gave the infant access to the
pool ignores an equally likely explanation that his children,
or others using the pool immediately prior to the death, left
the gate wide open.

The Court cannot allow a jury to guess

which act of negligence actually was the sole proximate cause
of the accident.

Similarly, since no one was present in the

pool area when the infant drowned, a jury cannot conclude
that the condition of the water frustrated rescue efforts
that might have saved him.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot prove a prima
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facie case and the Court should therefore affirm the judgment
of the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By ^cP^SbCL I J o ^ — —
E l l i o t t J/. Williams
Attorneyjfor DefendantRespondent
s
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